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Abstract: DRMs are intellectual property institutions. They transpose the empirical 
principle of copyright, which implicitly recognizes that specific ownership rules should be 
attached to non scientific creation, into the digital era. The legal protection of DRMs, a 
private means of enforcing content excludability, participates in the "privatization" of 
copyright protection. This, in turn, means that a proprietary software — governed by 
intellectual property rights, reinforced by public law — becomes the key to the vertical 
relations shaped by exclusive copyright. DRMs consequently represent a major stake in 
the competition to capture network effects in the content distribution vertical chain. 
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igital Right Management systems (DRMs) are commonly perceived 
as technical nuisances invented by content owners to prevent 
consumers from fully enjoying the enhanced benefits offered by a 
digital age. This ridiculous function explains the painful roll-out of DRMs, 
which can, in the best case scenario, be dismantled by avant-garde 
information technologies such as media players, laptops, broadband open 
networks and peer-to-peer software. The content industry is renowned for 
shying away  from innovation, and for running to court to protect its rents. 
Everyone recalls how ruthlessly the studios sued the consumer electronics 
industry thirty years ago in an attempt to block the roll-out of VCRs. And 
how, in the end, they lost and were forced to adapt as a result. 
 D
From an economic standpoint, it is widely accepted that innovation 
proceeds through a Schumpeterian destructive-creation whose effect is to 
abolish rents from obsolete systems, thanks to inventive technical or 
economical solutions. That vision implicitly applies to physical distribution 
systems for content, such as music records or DVDs, justifying the massive 
circumvention allowed by innovative information technologies. DRMs are 
often seen as a harmless trick to block that process. 
In fact, DRMs are intellectual property institutions. They transpose the 
empirical principle of copyrights, which implicitly recognizes that specific 
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ownership rules should be attached to non scientific creation, into the digital 
era. Those rules constitute the economic basis of the creative industries that 
provide expensive, useful and enjoyable mass consumption information 
goods. Unlike patents, creative goods are not rendered obsolete through 
scientific innovation or additional creation. They therefore need to be 
effectively protected; otherwise the innovation process is distorted by false 
signals of intellectual property theft. In other words, the destructive-creation 
process leading to economic innovation should not be biased by systematic 
creative property destruction. Yet it is because there are two sets of 
industries involved in the process. 
On the borderline between innovative and creative industries, the story of 
DRMs clearly illustrates the conflict of interests inherent to that situation. 
  Copyright principles 
Cultural contents are the only information goods that are simultaneously 
experience goods. Their experience dimension — one needs to consume 
them before gaining knowledge of them, nobody knows their market in 
advance — has far-reaching implications in terms of production, marketing 
and financing. We will not look at this topic in greater detail here, focusing 
instead on the information dimension of DRMs. However, it is worth 
remembering that their consumption via experimentation makes contents 
economically different from many functional information goods such as 
software programs or patents. 
As information goods, contents have been characterized since the 
seminal paper of Arrow in 1962 by the two major properties of public goods: 
non-rivalry and non-excludability. The consumption of a non-rival good by an 
additional person does not decrease the amount available for others. Given 
the nullity of its marginal cost, it should be priced at zero to reach maximal 
social welfare. A good is non-excludable when it is impossible to prevent 
someone consuming it, even when s/he does not pay anything for it. Non-
excludability induces a deficit of incentives to create as producers anticipate 
underpayment.  
Incentives to create can be re-established in two ways. A first possibility 
is to reward content producers through public remuneration schemes based 
on tax revenues or levies on ancillary products. The second solution is to 
rebuild excludability on contents. Copyright laws reward content owners with 
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exclusive rights to reproduction, distribution, representation, adaptation and 
translation, but for a limited period. This is the result of a trade-off aimed at 
maximizing social welfare, balancing incentives to create that would require 
infinite protection against the benefits of cultural diffusion that would require 
no protection at all.  
Private Technical Protection Measures (TPMs) supplement copyright 
laws with self-enforcing access and copy control measures. Access control 
measures enforce consumers to pay to access content. The general idea is 
simple: the information good is bundled with some private good that gives its 
properties of excludability and rivalry to the entire bundle (VARIAN,1998). 
The content may be bundled either with physical supports (books, 
newspapers, tapes, CDs, DVDs) or with tickets (concerts, movie projections, 
pay-TV broadcasts) to form what Watts (2000) calls "delivery goods and 
services." Concurrently, copy control measures define consumers' freedom 
of use. These technical protection measures are not only private, but also 
cooperative: they have to be adopted simultaneously by the content industry, 
its distribution networks – including, of course, terminal equipment - and end 
consumers.  
The exclusive copyright system is the result of these two principles: a 
public principle (copyright laws) and a private principle (TPMs). 
Copyright laws not only constitute the basis of content protection, but 
also inform the industrial organization of content industries. They enable a 
better allocation of decision rights along the different segments of the vertical 
chain. Vertical selection and financing mechanisms are based on exclusive 
copyright. This is also necessary to segment content markets into different 
territories and versions. 
  DRMs: a digital copyright principle 
Digitization embodies the theoretical public good nature of contents in a 
highly concrete form: each copy is an original and each consumer a potential 
broadcaster. This change of status has turned into a social phenomenon, 
with the surge of broadband networks and PC equipment as content 
distribution systems. Copyright issues have changed: the number of 
potential diffusion channels is growing together with threats to content 
owners' revenues and incentives to create. Moreover, the massive content 
circumvention trend questions individual prosecutions in terms of costs and 
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of social acceptance. Following the 1996 WIPO Treaties, the European 
Union and the United States adopted digital copyright laws, EUCD 1 and 
DMCA 2, that shifted the balance of the exclusive rights system with a 
"radical innovation," namely the legal protection of DRMs.  
Digital Rights Management systems (DRMs) refer to digital access, copy 
and redistribution control mechanisms for copyrighted contents such as 
music, video or text. They can be used either on physical supports (like 
DVDs) or on purely digital files. DRMs control access to digital content files: 
they are the entry ticket bundled with digital songs, texts and movies that 
make them excludable. Early examples of DRMs like the Serial Copy 
Management System for digital audiotapes or the Content Scrambling 
System (CSS) for DVDs were just copy restriction tools. But DRMs can also 
control the freedom attached to digital contents. They assign a pre-defined 
and self-enforcing set of uses to each item of digital content covering rights 
to view (hear), modify, record, excerpt, translate into another language, keep 
for a certain period, distribute, etc. 
Given how hard it is to sue individual circumventors, without DRMs each 
consumer would exercise completel control over the exploitation digital files. 
The legal protection of DRMs — a private means of enforcing content 
excludability — is part of a "privatization" of copyright protection. This makes 
proprietary software, governed by intellectual property rights and reinforced 
by public law, crucial to the vertical relations shaped by exclusive copyright. 
  Content distribution systems 
Contents are distributed to the end consumer through systems consisting 
of delivery infrastructures (physical retail, broadcast, broadband, mobile etc.) 
and via terminal equipment. All devices that enable consumers to select, 
receive, render and store contents, be they fixed or mobile, are pieces of 
content distribution systems. According to this definition, contents and all 
delivery equipment are complementary goods. The systemness (Rosenberg, 
1994) of digital content distribution comes from the need for technical 
interoperability between each link of the vertical chain. 
                     
1 EUCD: European Copyright Directive (22 May 2001). 
2 DMCA: Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998) 
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All types of information systems are subject to powerful "network effects" 
- also called bandwagon effects - whereby users' benefits increase with the 
number of users. Network effects include "direct" effects, which are directly 
proportional to the number of users (fax or telephone services), and 
"indirect" effects mediated by a market such as complementary products, for 
example: the music ringtone industry indirectly benefits from GSM network 
effects; while MS Windows indirectly benefits from the effects of the internet 
network. Moreover, direct network or bandwagon effects also occur in 
experience or fashionable goods such as contents, where the testing of the 
good by early adopters increases its value for other consumers. For each 
Harry Potter fan, the utility of the movie increases with the number of fans 
s/he can exchange with. 
LEIBENSTEIN (1950) was the first economist to stress the importance of 
bandwagon effects on the demand function. ROHLFS (1974) modelled the 
network effects through an aggregated demand curve. He showed that there 
is a critical mass of subscribers below which a network cannot be 
sustainable. Before this mass is reached, any resignation brings the 
willingness-to-pay of the remaining members under the price of the service. 
Any equilibrium is instable. Once critical mass is reached, the utility of all 
consumers stands above the price of the network. Moreover, every new 
consumer brings additional utility to all the others. The main issue is 
consequently how to achieve critical mass? One rule of thumb is to 
subsidize early adopters. What tends to vary tremendously are the means of 
subsidy selected and the economic signals given by the subsidy. 
The subsidy may occur across services within the same network. In the 
U.S. fixed telecoms sector, long distance calls were overcharged while local 
calls were subsidized to provide "universal service", namely no price 
discrimination for geographically isolated consumers. The subsidy may also 
occur through vertical relations within networks. In Europe, GSM telephone 
operators have been able to charge fixed networks high termination fees for 
fixed-to-mobile calls, while the regulated fixed networks have been 
powerless to retaliate. The money transfer resulting from high 
interconnection charges 3 has been partially passed onto consumers 
through handset subsidies. Network effects in mobile networks have resulted 
in large-scale substitution of fixed calls by mobile.  
                     
3 About €19 billion for the UK, France and Germany between 1998 and 2002. BOMSEL, CAVE, 
LE BLANC, NEUMANN, 2003. 
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In many cases, cross-subsidies occur along the content vertical 
distribution chain. Piracy or copyright circumvention can be a form of cross-
subsidy: the utility of the distribution industry increases thanks to the 
availability of free content. YU (2003) and VARIAN (2004) both refer to the 
history of U.S. copyright law in the 19th century. After independence, 
newspapers and books were massively imported. In each state, local 
newspapers lobbied for a copyright law. The first federal Copyright Act voted 
in 1790 was limited to works by U.S. citizens. Between 1800 and 1860, the 
publishing industry expanded thanks to royalty free (and already market-
tested) English books. Along the same lines, the U.S. refused a bilateral 
treaty on copyright proposed by England in 1842. By 1880, however, as 
American authors (Hawthorne, Irving, Poe, Beecher-Stove, Twain, etc.) 
began to gain popularity, editors started to complain about unfair competition 
with from pirated foreign authors whose books could be sold more cheaply. 
As a result, the Congress voted in the International Copyright Act in 1891 
that expanded copyright provisions to foreign authors.  
This short story shows how industrial conflicts can surge in the 
enforcement of copyright protection: vertical cross-subsidies from content 
circumvention play a major role in the roll-out of distribution systems. The 
innovative nature of digital distribution is twofold. Firstly, while in physical 
distribution, the costs of logistics are fully supported by the retail network, in 
digital systems, the consumer has to invest in terminal equipment to access 
content. Such equipment has to be rolled-out in huge mass consumption 
markets showing network effects. Secondly, "private" copyright protection 
measures have to be rolled-out together with equipment and content, which 
means that TPM have to be adopted by all the vertical players. While vertical 
conflicts around TPM adoption have always arisen, their resolution is far 
more complex — and more crucial — when several systems involving many 
sets of firms compete together to capture network effects.  
  DRMs on dedicated content distribution systems  
We use the term "dedicated" for content distribution systems like the 
physical retailing of CDs or DVDs, radio or television where terminal 
equipment does not provide any utility beyond content consumption. 
Network effects on these networks are mediated by contents. Moreover, the 
prior consent of content owners is required (PICKER, 2004). Whenever 
content owners choose a standard, whether encrypted or not, network 
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effects promote it, as this standard allows consumers to access a larger 
range of contents. 
Digital dedicated distribution systems such as digital satellite or digital 
cable have benefited from the initial roll-out of the TV sets. The latter 
benefited from the "free-to-air" distribution model for audiovisual content. In 
other words, consumers accepted the need to buy TV sets because they 
offered access to free contents. The free-to-air model is based on the 
network effects associated with two-sided market platforms, through which 
the consumers of one side (the viewers) can be valued by the clients of the 
other (advertisers). As information goods, contents can easily be structured 
into two-sided information platforms, decreasing their utility for consumers 
with ads, but making it possible to broadcast them for free (ROCHET & 
TIROLE, 2004). The more viewers, the more advertisers, the more 
resources available for new content, etc. Once TV sets were in place, pay 
content services were rolled-out together with marginal additional equipment 
(set-top-boxes) subsidized by distributors. In such systems, content has 
always been in a position to monitor the network effects and therefore, to 
impose technical standards for delivery and protection on the vertical chain 
of distributors. 
Such systems will benefit from more flexible DRMs in the future, to allow 
contents to circulate within an authorized home network. The rapport de 
force of contents and their interest in such a roll-out should favour a surge in 
suitable solutions. 
  DRMs on the internet 
In the beginning no one knew what the internet would be used for. Yet 
every time the networks were boosted by additional capacity, application 
followed the roll-out, rather than preceding it. However, since its beginning, 
the internet has been driven by one-to-one communication applications. E-
mail, web services, instant messaging, e-commerce and network gaming 
take advantage of the two-way communication potential of the network. 
Those applications generate direct network effects that pull the broadband 
rollout. Peer-to-peer (P2P) applications have emerged in this context as a 
way of sharing content, but also, and even predominantly, as a way of 
circumventing copyright. These applications offer new uses for broadband 
services and use circumvention as a roll-out subsidy (BOMSEL et al, 2004)  
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On internet networks, content owners have less bargaining power to 
impose protection measures on their vertical partners. Firstly, indirect 
network effects mediated by content are no longer conditional to the prior 
consent of content owners. The huge range of contents available on P2P 
networks provide indirect network effects that benefit and subsidize the roll-
out of broadband networks (Internet Service Providers) and to all broadband 
complementary equipment (PCs, microprocessors, modems, software, 
music and video players). Secondly, internet networks are not dedicated to 
content distribution: PCs are multipurpose pieces of equipment, for which 
content consumption is only one of a wide range of applications. Moreover, 
they are pulled by one-to-one communications that provide strong direct 
network effects.  
Internet players consequently are under no obligation and stand to gain 
nothing from accelerating the pace of DRM roll-out. On the contrary, they 
have a vested interest in trying to impose their proprietary DRM standard, 
while benefitting from the wild compatibility of P2P formats like MP3 or DivX. 
These strategies have led to incompatibilities in DRMs between digital offers 
and mobile players that are slowing consumers' adoption of DRM-based 
online distribution. Moreover, they may incite consumers to circumvent DRM 
technologies or to use P2P networks. In this vicious circle, before the 
standards war is over, no equipment manufacturer can afford to launch a 
content players that does not accept circumvented MP3 files (Sony tried to 
launch a digital music player solely compatible with its DRMs files, but 
quickly gave-up this suicidal strategy).  
The on-line digital music market illustrates the reasons behind and 
results of incompatible DRM systems. Four major players are trying to 
impose their proprietary DRM standard. Two of them, Sony and Apple, 
refuse to license their DRM technology to other digital music distributors and 
portable players' manufacturers. Their proprietary DRMs (Apple Fair Play 
and Sony Open Magic Gate) secure a complete music distribution system 
composed of an internet music store, a media player and mobile players. 
Real Networks and Microsoft are pursuing the opposite strategy, namely 
trying to attract as many music stores and portable players manufacturers as 
possible to their own DRM technology (WMA DRM and Helix). Helix is open 
and Microsoft sells very cheap licenses for its WMA. Given its large market 
share, Apple's proprietary strategy induces major incompatibility issues 
between on-line music stores and mobile players. 
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  DRM system roll-out issues  
The P2P problem: innovation versus creation 
Massive circumvention via P2P networks is the major obstacle to the  
roll-out of DRMs. "Copyright respectful" digital offers cannot compete with 
easily accessible free contents. While free-to-air models decrease the utility 
of the consumer with ads, P2P offers the same product as paying content, 
with greater choice and flexibility of use. In addition, because it increases the 
utility of devices, P2P kills incentives for equipment manufacturers to loyally 
secure their products. However, many voices have been raised in opposition 
to DRMs for the sake of P2P technologies. DRMs have been accused of 
impeding innovation in digital technologies and networks. While the 
argument of P2P and DRMs being technologically incompatible does not 
stand, it is disputable that the cross-subsidization of new distribution 
systems by free contents may end up benefitting creative industries in the 
long term. The reference often cited for this long-term benefit is the large 
VHS market opened up by VCRs. However to what extend can innovation 
be promoted at the expense of incentives to create?  
The evolution of U.S. court decisions on copying technologies shows 
that, with digitization, a new line has been crossed. In the famous 1984 
Betamax case, Universal Studios and Walt Disney accused Sony 
Corporation of infringing their copyrights. Arguing that individuals' use of 
VCR (Video Cassette Recorders) would seriously damage their revenues, 
especially from advertising, they wanted the production and importation of 
VCRs to be prohibited. In a narrow vote the Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
Sony, considering that "time shifting" (recording television broadcasts for 
later viewing) was fair use. Moreover, as VCRs were primarily used for that 
purpose, selling them was not considered to be copyright infringement, 
despite their potentially unauthorized uses. An interpretation of this judgment 
could be that the VCR technology's potential infringement on copyright was 
considered to be overridden by the overall benefits of innovation.  
However, this logic changed with the judgement on the (secondary) 
liability of P2P software providers for copyright infringement. In 2001 and 
2003, the U.S. courts found two centrally mediated P2P systems (Napster 
and Amster) liable, as they materially contributed to copyright infringement. 
European courts applied the same logic. This trend was clearly confirmed in 
the MGM versus Grokster case. In the beginning, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
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applied the Sony-Betamax guideline and found no secondary liability of the 
decentralized peer-to-peer software providers for their users' copyright 
infringement. The decision focused on the non-infringing uses of P2P 
networks (exchange of non copyrighted material) and on the lack of control 
of P2P vendors over infringing uses. In June 2005, however, the Supreme 
Court ruled that P2P software providers could be held liable for copyright 
infringements committed by their users if they actively encourage that 
infringement. Three criteria were then defined to judge such active 
inducement of infringing uses: the marketing of infringing uses, the lack of a 
technology to fight them and the place of infringement in the business 
model. This decision led to the closure of the Grokster company 4. 
Compatibility issues 
A second obstacle to the roll-out of DRMs is their incompatibility. This is 
intrinsically linked to the existence of P2P networks. Manufacturers would be 
more inclined to make DRMs compatible, if P2P networks did not already 
provide this service through circumvented compatible contents. Moreover, 
the incompatibility of DRMs incites consumers to seek circumvented 
contents on P2P networks. This vicious circle fully benefits equipment 
manufacturers.  
The impact of the incompatibility of DRMs on consumers is not 
unanimously considered negative, as it may result in a price decrease: if 
there are no network effects, incompatible vertically integrated systems face 
more elastic demand than compatible components (MATUTES & 
REGIBEAU, 1988). However, consumer surplus may not be superior to 
cases where systems are compatible. Indeed, compatibility increases 
variety, enabling consumers to mix and match (MATUTES & REGIBEAU, 
1988). However, in the case of incompatibility, consumers remain free to 
accept or refuse each distributor's offer. This rule mostly applies to 
dedicated networks similar to broadcasting.  
The rule applies as long as the consumer can chose between different 
integrated systems. In the second stage of a dynamic game, incompatibility 
may indeed lessen competition and prices may rise as one system may win 
                     
4 In Europe, the last decision on decentralized P2P software liability found no liability. The 2002 
BUMA vs. KaZaa case, Amsterdam Court of Appeals, later affirmed by Dutch Supreme Court, 
considered that the KaZaa software was not used for "exclusively" infringing purposes. 
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the market (KATZ & SHAPIRO, 1994). This monopolization depends on the 
existence and strength of network effects. In the case of incompatible 
systems offering contents over the internet (as in the case of on-line music), 
network effects are mainly mediated by contents. They depend on the 
differentiation level of the content offering and on the range of contents that 
each system may provide. If one platform monopolizes all the on-line 
offerings of digital contents, the range of content variety accessible through 
digital distribution may be endangered. Another possible scenario, once the 
standards war is won, is that a DRM standard may start to be licensed as a 
monopoly in the vertical chain. However, this monopolization may not 
happen as every system benefits from strong indirect network effects 
provided by… compatible circumvented contents. 
Moral hazard in content distribution 
As equipment and software manufacturers are the only beneficiaries of 
ineffective DRMs, it can be assumed that incompatibility is a source of 
"moral hazard" in digital content distribution 5. Moral hazard means that 
these distributors are not doing their best to maximize the returns of their 
principals. Such moral hazard distorts the competition with distribution 
systems that protect copyright, gives out wrong signals to the market and 
misorients investment.  
In broadcast networks, the contents monitor the utility of the system. In 
this case, there is little moral hazard attached to content protection within the 
system itself. The hazard may come from new digital recording equipment 
able to store contents in an open format through the analogue hole, and 
from the competition with open architecture systems that promote the 
diffusion of P2P files. This competition is forcing broadcasters into a race to 
roll-out DRMs due to a rise in content utility. This is why the launch of HDTV 
in Europe will be aimed at stuffing the analogue hole and enforcing 
consumers to record images in encrypted formats. Another example is the 
subsidization of set-top-box DVRs to promote the content recording through 
adapted DRMs. 
                     
5 Moral hazard occurs in a vertical relation where one party pursues its private interests at the 
other's expense. One example of moral hazard is drivers that behave carelessly when they 
know that the insurance company will pay for all of the damages. Moral hazard may deter 
players from engaging in mutually beneficial transactions. It reduces welfare by blocking such 
efficient vertical transactions. Moral hazard is also a source of market failure. 
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The consequences of moral hazard in internet-based content distribution 
are more serious for content that has no alternative digital distribution 
channel. Video content is massively distributed through digital broadcast 
systems, so it can withstand (even unfair) competition with broadband. 
However, digital music depends heavily upon the internet 6. This is why the 
compatibility of music DRMs is such a controversial issue. 
  Conclusion 
The paradox is that imposing DRM interoperability to protect copyright for 
cultural goods somehow calls into question the copyright of individual  
DRMs. Existing reverse engineering provisions for compatibility do not apply 
to DRMs: complex reverse engineering processes could not follow the fast 
pace of renewals of these security tools. Mandatory licensing, mandatory 
disclosure of DRMs interoperability information and public standardization 
are the different solutions available to public authorities willing to impose 
interoperability on DRMs. Critical issues are then the choice of the players 
that will support the costs of interoperability and the effective security of 
interoperable DRMs. The problem can be seen as the internalization of the 
negative externalities of incompatibility. The general principle in such cases 
is that the beneficiaries of the moral hazard pay the costs of interoperability. 
However, the lack of interoperability is not the only source of moral hazard. 
Interoperability will not be enough to ensure that copyright is respected or to 
achieve fair competition between content distributors. The solution should 
also imply the containment of illegal P2P networks and the implementation, 
probably at the hardware level, of efficient DRM protection able to 
discriminate between copyrighted and non copyrighted content. This is the 
only way to restore the content monitoring of indirect network effects in open 
communication systems. 
                     
6 Mobile telephony is indeed an alternative, but fixed broadband networks are far more 
convenient. 
O. BOMSEL & A.G. GEFFROY 47 
References 
BOMSEL O., CAVE M., LE BLANC G. & NEUMANN H. (2003): "How mobile 
termination rates shape the European telecom industry", Cerna, Ecole des Mines de 
Paris. 
BOMSEL O.; LE BLANC G., CHARBONNEL J. & ZAKARIA A. (2004): "Economic 
Issues of Content Distribution", Riam Contango Project, Cerna, Ecole des Mines de 
Paris. 
KATZ  M.  & SHAPIRO C. (1994): "Systems Competition and Network Effects," 
Journal of Economic Perspectives.  
LEIBENSTEIN H. (1950): "Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen effects in the Theory of 
Consumers' Demand", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 64, no. 2, May 1950. 
MATUTES C. & REGIBEAU P. (1988): "Mix and Match: Product Compatibility 
Without Network Externalities", Rand Journal of Economics, 19 (2), 219-234. 
PICKER R. (2004): "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and 
Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright". 
ROCHET J.C. & TIROLE J. (2004): "Two-Sided Markets: An Overview". 
ROHLFS J. (1974): "A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications 
Service," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. 
ROSENBERG N. (1994): "Inside the blackbox", Cambridge University Press. 
VARIAN H.: 
- (1998): "Markets for Information Goods". 
- (2004): "Copying and Copyright". 
WATT R. (2000): Copyright and Economic Theory. Friends or Foes?, Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
YU P.  (2003): "The Copyright Divide", Michigan State University. 
 
